New developments in the mineral conflict between the EU and the U.S.

Different strategies

The Buyer's Club is adapted to the EU's mineral legislation, CRMA. It does not interfere with the authority that the EU obtains through CRMA over mineral resources and value chains covered by CRMA. All EU member states are automatically included in CRMA, and the EEA countries are planning incorporation into CRMA. In addition, the EU can obtain authority over third-country mineral resources through CRMA.

The EU has very limited mineral resources within its own territory and is therefore on the purchasing side. The Buyer's Club cannot provide price guarantees, but it is assumed that members, through joint purchasing and storage capacity, can reduce prices and thereby improve their competitive position relative to China. As Canada is a resource owner, it may be difficult to identify the Canadian benefit, but Canada is not an EU member and will not be affected by CRMA legislation. Furthermore, the model entails continued free trade with China, and Canada has over the past year established close trade relations with China. The EU's strategy is to maintain free trade with China, which contributes to the conflict with the United States.

The American model differs substantially, and the Trump administration intends to create a Western minerals market that can make itself independent of mineral supplies from China. The US wants to establish a price floor for critical minerals in order to secure a sustainable Western minerals industry and attract investors to new mineral extraction projects on Western territory. Over the past year, the US has built up a substantial mineral stockpile, launched new mineral projects on its own continent, and concluded bilateral minerals agreements with other countries. The US is laying the groundwork for a Western market large enough to bear the costs of establishing a price floor.

The EU's challenges are primarily a lack of resources within its own territory, as well as the internal market that is too small to absorb the transformation costs associated with becoming independent of raw materials from China. Neither Norway nor Greenland, both of which possess large mineral resources, have full EU membership, making these countries central to the conflict.

The United States moves forward

Trump is not waiting for the G7. Having officially rejected the Buyer's Club, the next step will be to offer bilateral agreements, with the goal of presenting offers to the EU and Japan during June. This is a planned progression by the United States described in Proclamation 11001 of 14 January this year. Initially, the offer will apply to five to ten minerals that China has subjected to export restrictions.

Through the aforementioned proclamation, Trump instructed his administration to negotiate mineral agreements and assess price floors, with a deadline of 13 July for a status report to the President.

If negotiations do not produce results by the deadline, the proclamation provides authority to impose tariffs, import restrictions, and minimum prices. Read more here.

Tariffs serve two functions in this context: they protect American mineral-related industry and help finance the price floor that the US has set out to implement. The message the US is sending with this is: join a protected Western mineral market where the cost of a price floor is shared among the allies, or pay the cost through tariffs.

Norway is the paralyzed resource owner

Norway possesses Europe's largest deposits of rare earth elements, the third largest in the world after China and Brazil.

The Norwegian government moved from having given commitments to Trump regarding mineral supplies to making a U-turn by prematurely announcing incorporation into the EU's mineral legislation, CRMA. The Labour Party government committed itself to the EU's mineral strategy as early as March 2025 and has since awaited the outcome of the conflict between the United States and the EU. This has, among other things, resulted in the Norwegian government failing to conclude a new trade agreement with the United States before the deadline of 31 July 2025. Furthermore, Norway has not joined FORGE, but did join Pax Silica in May; these, however, represent only a commitment to political cooperation, not legally binding agreements. Read in detail about the Norwegian situation here.

It is worth noting that under CRMA, a state-owned mineral company cannot operate under conditions known from Statoil/Equinor. Furthermore, Norway cannot freely invest through the sovereign wealth fund. Under CRMA, Norway must operate in the same mineral market as China, without price guarantees.

Alternatively, should Norway choose to veto the CRMA and conclude a bilateral minerals agreement with the US, Norway would be able both to run a state minerals company with investments from the oil fund, and to obtain bankruptcy protection through guaranteed price floors under a plurilateral agreement. Such a framework would have implications for every link in the supply chain; for example, the battery factory Morrow, which went bankrupt earlier this year, would have had better terms.

If Norway does not conclude a minerals agreement with the US, it is likely that Norwegian products containing minerals will be subject to tariffs under the two US sections, 232 and 301.

The Store government has not demonstrated leadership commensurate with the enormous mineral resources Norway possesses, resources that provide significant geopolitical power. Norway is a resource owner, but the government pursues a policy determined by the EU, which is on the purchasing side. The Norwegian people own Norway's mineral resources, and the government is failing in its management of those resources on behalf of the population. This could prove fatal for future Norwegian ownership, Norwegian welfare, and Norwegian sovereignty.